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RESPONSIBILITY FOR THE WAR.^
BY FRED. C. CONYBEARE.
A LADY remarked to me lately that it was too terrible to thinkthat our brave fellows should be bearing the hardships of
the trenches, should be enduring wounds and death, for any but
a wholly righteous cause. Our sufferings alone, she urged, prove
that justice is on our side; and she shook with wrath when I
suggested that by the same test the Germans could be shown to
be in the right. Her attitude, which may properly be described as
tribalism, was all very well as long as we had little except the
lies and insincerities of our public men and press with which to
combat the Germans, but now that we are putting into the field
some two million good soldiers to prove that we are as brave and
capable of fighting as they are, surely the time is come when
rationalists anyhow can make a more serious attempt to under-
stand the course of events than Mr. McCabe and Mr. Charles T.
Gorham have done.
I admit at the outset that by invading Belgium the Germans
left us no choice but to intervene. This is so, even if we allow
^ This article was accompanied by the following personal letter to the
editor : "Dear Dr. Cams—You and I have been good friends in the past and
have worked in our respective spheres for the humanizing and enlightening
of opinion in both hemispheres. I therefore invite you to publish in The Open
Court the enclosed MS. together with this communication to yourself. It was
originally sent to the Literary Guide, the monthly organ of the Rationalist
league, for I did not see why England's case should be entirely left, in its col-
umns, to the tender mercies of Mr. McCabe and Mr. Gorham. My use of the
English White Paper however was too frank for the taste of that journal, and
its editors refused to publish it.
"Germany at present is resounding with hymns of hatred against England,
but I hope and believe that Germans will come to see that my countrymen
were as a whole averse to war until by the invasion of a weak and defenceless
Belgium they were goaded into it. The fact that the German ambassador in
London on August 1 was ready to give an assurance that Belgium would not
be molested if we would undertake to be neutral, proves that the passage over
her soil of German armies was not the unavoidable military necessity which
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with Sir E. Grey that their action "was not wanton," and that
"Germany feared that if she did not occupy Belgium France
might do so." Mr. Lloyd George has recently assured us that for
him, as for ninety-five percent of the business men of London,
Belgium made the whole difference, and that nothing short of the
violation of her neutrality could have inclined him or them to war.
His attitude is and was my own, and I maintain that the Times
of March 8 takes up an immoral position when it writes that
"Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg is quite right" in what he says of
us, that as "in the great war we did not lavish our gold from love
of German or of Austrian liberty or out of sheer altruism," so in
this war we have "invested it for our own safety and our own
advantage" ; and, the Times adds, as then "on the whole our com-
mitments were rewarded by an adequate return," so they will be in
this war. Yet I venture to think what turned the scale on
August 3 in the House of Commons was the eloquent appeal of
the late Mr. Gladstone, as Sir E. Grey repeated it. Here it is
:
"We have an interest in the independence of Belgium which is
wider than that which we may have in the literal operation of the
guarantee. It is found in the answer to the question whether,
under the circumstances of the case, this country, endowed as it
is with influence and power, would quietly stand by and witness
the perpetration of the direst crime that ever stained the pages of
history, and thus become participators in the sin." If Grey had
Herr von Bethmann-Hollweg on August 4 asserted it to be. In any case it
meant that Belgium would be turned into a shambles. I hold that Sir E. Grey
did wrong in binding England by his secret engagements (unknown even to
the English cabinet and probably to the king) to take part against Germany in
a war over an issue which did not concern us. He erred in making any de-
fensive and offensive secret alliance with France, until the latter power should
have composed her quarrel with Germany. Still the fact remains, duly attested
by our own and even by the French diplomatic books, that he and his secret
policy would have been cast aside by our cabinet, parliament and nation, had
not the German General Staff with cynical disregard of justice and inter-
national law actually played into his and Sazonof's hands. Had that Staff
known a little more of human nature, they would have foreseen that their
aggression on Belgium, premeditated and planned for years, was the one thing
that would light a flame among us, and alienate the sympathies both of Amer-
ica and Italy. They deliberately provoked us to war, as, I consider, Sazonof
provoked the poor Kaiser ; and I fear there is nothing for us now but to fight
it out. May I suggest that you should print in your journal the passages
which I have marked in the current number of the Candid Quarterly. This is
a journal edited by Mr. Thos. Gibson Bowles, and it may be said to represent
the "Young Tory" party. I believe that its stern condemnation of Sir E. Grey's
policy is well merited, though I do not see eye to eye with the editor in many
matters, and, particularly, in the essentially aggressive designs of the present
Kaiser against England.—I am yours sincerely, Fred. C. Conybeare, M.A.,
F.B.A., Honorary Fellow 'Univ. Coll. Oxford, Hon. Dr. Theol. Giessen, Hon.
LL.D. St. Andrews."
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dangled this war before our Parliament as an "investment," he
would have found few to support him.
Now my object here is to point out that we should not now
be at war, and that Europe would probably not be at war with
herself if Sir E- Grey had taken up this ethical standpoint from
the first and stuck to it.
The war originated in a quarrel between Austria and Servia.
In such a war were we under any obligation, moral or material,
to join? As to the moral obligation. Grey declared on July 20 that
for us or any other power to "be dragged into a war by Servia
would be detestable" (White Paper 1). We assured Austria that
"if in the course of the present grave crisis our point of view
should sometimes differ from hers, this would arise not from want
of sympathy with the many just complaints which Austria-Hungary
had against Servia," etc. (White Paper 62). On July 29 (ibid. 91)
Grey told the Austrian ambassador in London that he "did not
wish to discuss the merits of the question between Austria and
Servia."
Were we then under material obligations to go to war over
Servia?
On this point Sir G. Buchanan, our ambassador at St. Peters-
burg, was emphatic. On July 24 he was urged by Sazonof and
the French ambassador there, "to proclaim our solidarity with
Russia and France." "They continued to press me," he writes
(White Paper 6), "for a declaration of complete soHdarity of His
Majesty's government with French and Russian governments."
He reports his answer thus: "Personally I saw no reason to
expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's govern-
ment that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part
to support Russia and France by force of arms. Direct British
interests in Servia were nil, and a war on behalf of that country
would never be sanctioned by British public opinion."
It is certain that if Grey had remained true to this twofold
standpoint, that neither duty nor interests called upon us to inter-
vene, France would not have stirred, for she relied upon our aid,
and she would have held back her ally Russia. The fire in the
heather might have been thus stamped out from the beginning,
and never have become a vast conflagration consuming the whole
of Europe.
It may be said: "Oh, but we could not allow Germany once
more to humiliate Russia." But Austria gave assurances from the
first that she only wished to chastise Servia and not touch her in-
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tegrity or sovereign rights (White Paper 18, 57, 62, 64, 72, 75, 79,
137, etc.)- There was therefore not involved any particular humili-
ation of Russia, which in 1876. 1878, 1897, had in special conven-
tions thrice assigned Servia to the Austrian sphere of influence in
the Balkans, reserving Bulgaria as her own sphere. The Austrians
had a better quarrel with Servia than we ever had with the Boers,
and Russia less excuse for throwing her aegis over Servia than
Germany would have had in 1900 for throwing hers over the Trans-
vaal. But in view of Sir E. Grey's repeated disclaimers of all
interest in the rights and wrongs of Servia it is superfluous to
press this point. He not less emphatically denied that France had
any cause to interfere in a Servian squabble. For example, on
July 31 (ibid. 116) he writes to Sir F. Bertie, our ambassador at
Paris, that "in this case France is being drawn into a dispute which
is not hers."
That being so, why did he not warn France from the first that
if she, merely as Russia's ally, chose to go to war with Germany,
she would do so at her own risk? Why did he not point out that,
as it was not her dispute, the Germans could not be accused of
an unprovoked attack on her if they defended themselves in a war
into which she might follow Russia? It is useless to urge that
France was bound by her treaty with Russia. That was her look-
out, and she did not allege her treaty but her interests as a reason
for accepting war with Germany. Is any one so naif as to suppose
that Russia would go out of her way to aid France in similar
circumstances? Would Russia ever intervene vi et armis to save
England from any humiliation whatever?
Russia from the first resolved to take up the quarrel of Servia
and assert a protectorate over her as against Austria, and on July
25 mobilized her southern armies against Austria—this, although
Germany categorically warned her that she would protect her ally.
Austria declared war on Servia on July 28 and on July 29 pro-
ceeded to bombard Belgrade. Then at last Grey yielded to Sazonof 's
appeal that he should declare our "complete solidarity" with France
and Russia, and he warned Germany that if France went to war
we must intervene on her side and could not stand aside (White
Paper 89, 102, 111, 116, 119).
Till now Germany, while insisting that Austria intended only
to chastise Servia and not impair her sovereign rights or appro-
priate any of her territory, had been intransigent in her attitude.
Ex post facto she had approved of Austria's note to Servia, and
toward Russia she assumed an air of "you can take it or leave it."
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She hoped to bhifif her as in 1909. At the same time she was ready
to fight Russia and France, if they wanted to fight her. Sazonof
and the two Cambons- on their side equally intended to fight her
if they could get possession of the weak man with the strong fleet,
Sir E. Grey. Both sides took Grey's warning of July 29 very
seriously. It was in eflfect an ultimatum to Germany and an as-
surance of support to Russia ; and an impartial witness, the Belgian
minister at St. Petersburg, the Baron de I'Escaille, wrote on the
evening of July 30 to his government at Brussels that on that day
people there were "firmly convinced, nay they had a positive assur-
ance to the effect, that England would support France. This assur-
ance of support was of enormous importance, and had contributed
not a little to encourage the war party." And he adds: "Although
on the day before there were such divergencies of opinion in the
Czar's council of ministers that the ukase ordering mobilization
was delayed, a change of scene subsequently took place, the war
party gained the upper hand, and to-day (July 30) at four o'clock
the order for mobilization was published. The army, which is
conscious of its strength, is full of enthusiasm and reposes great
hopes on the progress it has achieved since the Japanese war. The
navy is so far from having realized its program of reconstruction
and reorganization that one cannot count upon it. And this is just
the reason why so much importance is attached to the assurance
of support given by England."^
But just in proportion as Sir Edward Grey's warning raised
the hopes of Sazonof, it depressed those of Germany, who instantly
set herself to conciliate Russia and buy off England. Thus she
sent her Ambassador, Count Pourtales, at 2 a. m. on the morning
of July 30, to Sazonof. He "completely broke down," so we read
(White Paper 97), "on seeing that war was inevitable. He ap-
pealed to M. Sazonof to make some suggestion which he could
telegraph to the German government as a last hope."
It was now Sazonof's turn to bluff Germany, and he dictated a
* French ambassadors in Berlin and London.
'The first paragraphs of this dispatch are equally interesting with those
which I cite
:
"M. le Ministre. Yesterday [July 29] and the day before have been passed
in expectation of the events which were bound to follow upon the declaration
of war by Austria on Servia.
"Most contradictory news has been in circulation, without it being pos-
sible to distinguish truth from falsehood, about the Imperial Government's
intentions. What is certain is that Germany has endeavored, noless here than in
Vienna, to find any means whatever, to avoid a general conflict; but she has
been confronted, on one side, with the obstinate determination of the Vienna
Cabinet not to yield an inch, and, on the other, with the distrust felt by the
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formula to Portales by which Austria was "to recognize that her con-
flict with Servia had assumed the character of a question of European
interest and declare herself ready to eliminate from her ultimatum
(to Servia) points which violate the principle of sovereignty of
Servia." This done, "Russia engaged to stop all military prepara-
tions."
The Austrian demand which violated Servian sovereignty was
that an Austrian assessor should sit on the Servian court of enquiry
into the assassination of the Archduke. He was not to have judicial
or executive powers, but only to see that the enquiry was not a
mock one. At Hodeida recently the Italians similarly demanded
of Turkey that their consul should sit on the Turkish court of
enquiry, and the demand was instantly granted.
The Germans spent July 30 in urging Austria to consider
Sazonof's terms. Austria had broken off negotiations with St.
Petersburg, and accordingly Bethmann-Hollweg in a note addressed
to her that day used these words : "We cannot expect Austria-
Hungary to negotiate with Servia, with which she is in a state of
war. The refusal, however, to exchange views with St. Peters-
burg would be a grave mistake. We are indeed ready to fulfil our
duty. As an ally we must, however, refuse to be drawn into a
world conflagration through Austria-Hungary not respecting our
advice." And the German ambassador was told to address this
warning to Berchtold, the Austrian chancellor, "with all emphasis
and great seriousness."*
Petersburg Cabinet of Austria's assurances that her only idea is to punish
Servia, and not possess herself of that country.
"M. Sazonof has declared that is was impossible for Russia not to hold
herself ready and not to mobilize, that however these preparations were not
directed against Germany. This morning an official communication to the
journals announces that 'the reservists have been called to arms in a certain
number of provinces.' Knowing the reserve usually practised in official
Russian communications, it is easy to infer that the mobilization is general.
The German ambassador has declared to-day that he has exhausted the en-
deavors for peace which since Saturday he has unremittingly pursued, and that
he is now left without any hope. I have been told that the English embassy
has expressed itself in the same manner. Great Britain has as a last resort
proposed arbitration. M. Sazonof has replied: 'We ourselves proposed it to
Austria-Hungary and she refused it.' To the proposal for a conference Ger-
many replied by proposing an understanding between the Cabinets. One may
well ask oneself if it is not the case that all parties want war and are only
trying to delay its declaration a little while in order to gain time. England
began by giving out that she did not intend to be drawn into a conflict. Sir
George Buchanan openly said so. To-day at Petersburg people are firmly con-
vinced etc."
* Mr. M. P. Price in his work The Diplomatic History of the War shows
that this telegram is genuine, although it has been impugned. Yet Mr. Gor-
ham quotes with approval Mr. Jas. M. Beck's denial that the Kaiser ever "gave
the world the text of any advice he gave the Austrian officials."
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Emperor Franz Joseph—the enfant terrible of the whole epi-
sode—had Sazonof's note (modified in certain ways by Grey, White
Paper 120) laid before him by Berchtold on the morning of July 31.
The old man's habit is to transact important affairs of state at
5 a. m. He so far yielded that Sazonof at once informed Grey
through his agent in London, De Etter, of his satisfaction at the
fact (White Paper 133) that "the Austro-Hungarian ambassador
had declared the readiness of his government to discuss the sub-
stance of the Austrian ultimatum to Servia." Sazonof adds that
"it is desirable that the discussions should take place in London
with the participation of the great powers." He also "hopes that
the British government will assume the direction of these discussions.
The whole of Europe would be thankful to them." The extent to
which Austria would have yielded to Russian demands would of
course have depended on the course of these "discussions," which
unhappily never took place.
One would have thought that Sazonof in this moment of diplo-
matic triumph might have been pleased to yield to the appeal which
the German emperor had been making to him for two days to stay
his military preparations against himself. For some reason or
another Grey would not second this appeal ; he was too much afraid
of Sazonof ever to oft'er him advice, and even as early as July 24
had made the "stiff" tone of the note to Servia an excuse for re-
fusing "to exercise any moderating influence on Russia" (White
Paper 10), and our ambassador at Vienna was told from the first
(White Paper 26) to support the policy of Sazonof. The latter now
chose the moment of his triumph to complete his mobilization against
Germany. This was early on the morning of July 31. As early as
July 26 the Germans had warned Russia that if she mobilized they
must do so too ; and, they added, "mobilization means war." Russia
paid no heed, with the result that at midnight on July 31 the Kaiser,
seized with panic, gave her 12 hours to demobilize, and getting no
answer, declared war late on August 1, on which day he also began
to mobilize in his turn. I do not seek to palliate the guilt of the
Kaiser in thus rushing into war, but I do aver that Sazonof had
done all he could to provoke the poor man to declare war, and
might have declared war himself if the Kaiser had not been in
such a hurry.
The English Cabinet was still averse to war.^ and, in spite of
" Mr. Lloyd George recently made the following statement : "This I know
is true— after the guarantee given that the German fleet would not attack
the coast of France or annex any French territory, I would not have been
RESPONSir.lLlTY FOR THE WAR. 401
Grey's secret undertakings to France, was willing to be neutral if
Germany would give, like l'>ance, an assurance not to violate ]5el-
gium's neutrality. They accordingly sent Grey on August 1 "to make
proposals [to the German ambassador] for England's neutrality
even in the event of Germany being at war with France as well as
with Russia." The ambassador immediately offered the required
assurance on condition that Grey would make a definite statement
with regard to our neutrality. Grey however refused "to be neutral
on that condition alone." The ambassador then "pressed him to
formulate conditions" on which we would be neutral. He even
offered that the integrity both of France and of her colonies might
be respected, in case France was beaten. Grey might also have
asked and obtained the condition that the German fleet should keep
itself in the North Sea. But Grey wanted to keep his hands free
and refused to be neutral on any conditions : and the next morning
(August 2) he did not even deem it worth his while to inform our
Cabinet of the German overtures of the day before, though a
majority thereof would certainly have embraced them. The Ger-
mans now made up their minds that we were really going to join
France against them ; and, thinking that they might as well be hung
for a sheep as a laml). went through Belgium. That issue swallowed
up all our earlier negotiations, and we had to go to war. The only
way to have kept out of it would have been to close with the offers
made by Germany on August 1." But Grey resolved not to do that,
and the Cabinet never heard of them in time.
It cannot be denied that on the morning of July 31 Russia had
obtained all she had asked for. On July 27 (White Paper 55)
Sazonof told our ambassador that all he wanted was that Servia's
"territorial integrity must be guaranteed and her rights as a sover-
eign state respected," and by the 31st not only were these terms
conceded by Austria, but Germany had oft'ered to see that they
a party to a declaration of war had Belgium not been invaded ; and I can say
the same thing for most, if not all, of my colleagues. If Germany had been
wise, she would not have set foot on Belgian soil ; the Liberal Government,
then, would not have intervened."
' A war of Germany and Austria with France and Russia was likely to
result in the emergence of many unforeseen issues and contingencies which
made it unwise of England beforehand to tie herself down unconditionally to
permanent neutrality. For example the war might have spread to Dutch,
Danish and Swedish soil, even America might have been drawn in as well as
Italy and Turkey. Nevertheless, since we had no army with which to repell a
German advance through Belgium, I regret that Grey did not accept Lych-
nowski's overtures. We should have saved her from the excesses of German
Schrecklichkeit.
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were carried out when the punitive expedition was ended. But
neither side trusted the other.
Grey's dispatches prove that his poHcy was to join in the war
if it became general, and especially if France elected to go in. This
he intended to do, Belgium or no Belgium. I believe it was an un-
wise policy. The Servian bone was foul and rotten, and stunk in
his nostrils as long as only one big dog was growling over it, but as
soon as the other big dogs began to snarl, it suddenly acquired for
him an almost sacramental importance.
Germany, if we may believe the Italian Foreign Minister, San
Juliano (White Paper 80), was all along "really anxious for good
relations with ourselves ;" and Sir E. Goschen at Berlin, in con-
versation with the German chancellor on August 4, remarked that
it "was part of the tragedy" that the two nations should "fall apart
just at the moment when the relations between them had been more
friendly and cordial than they had been for years." One may well
ask, if this was so, why Sir E. Grey did not accept the German over-
tures for peace three days earlier or at least give our very pacifist
Cabinet a chance to accept them. But he evidently agreed with his
friend M. Paul Cambon, the French ambassador in London (White
Paper 119, July 31), that "in 1870 we had made a great mistake
in allowing an enormous increase of German strength, and we
should now be repeating the mistake," if we did not attack Germany
when we could. This is the moral standpoint which prevails in a
thieves' kitchen. We made it, unwillingly and by accident, our own.
How the future historian will view this war we hardly can
say, but I suspect he will blame Russia and Germany about equally.
He will recognize that our House of Commons went to war to
rescue the weak and oppressed, and that, except for the violation
of Belgium, we would either not have gone to war at all, or have
done so with little enthusiasm. He will recognize that the Germans
honestly believed they were fighting a defensive war, which was to
rid them of the double incubus of Russia and France holding their
loaded revolvers at them on two frontiers. France will be rightly
credited with a passion for revanche ; the Russian peasant with
his blind traditional loyalty for his "Little Father" the Czar. Finally
the historian will conclude that any one of the five combatants with
a little good-will could have prevented the war at the outset of the
crisis and at any subsequent phase of it up to August 1 ; and he
will blame all alike for the bloody popular convulsions, the plague
and famine, the uprising of the East against the West, of the
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yellow races against the white, the wasting feuds between race
and race, the war between classes, the overthrow of faith in human-
ity, the destruction of all schemes of social amelioration, the gen-
eral bankruptcy of states and individuals, the revival of super-
stition, the decay of literature and art, and countless other evils
which will follow in its train all over Europe.
